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Since the 1950s, research on the social organization of lawyers has
attracted legal scholars and social scientists interested in jurisprudence and
the justice system. Law is no longer considered only a system of state
commands or a technical mechanism to resolve disputes, but also a body of
knowledge shaped by experts and professionals and a site of power for
controlling the production of such knowledge. Thus, questions about the
groups that comprise the legal profession have become an integral part of
research about law and the legal system. Lawyers, a dominant group within
the legal profession (alongside judges and the legal academia), are part of
"law making." As Philip S. C. Lewis contends, "[lawyers] stand between
the formal legal system and those who are subject to or take advantage of
it."1 They are necessary agents for people who wish to enjoy the protection
of law. They draw legal materials that constitute the basis of legal
arguments and reasoning. They formulate contracts, take part in drafting
legislation, manage negotiations, and are necessary agents within
adjudication.2
This Symposium inquires into the relationship between lawyers and
democracy. The richness of its essays attests to the variety of paradigms in
which one could examine this question. As Fred Zacharias describes in the
opening remarks to his essay in this volume, one could ask whether lawyers
can promote the values of democracy, given frequent inconsistencies
* Tel Aviv University Faculty of Law. I wish to thank the participants in the Symposium
and, in particular, Fred Zacharias for providing essential resources for this essay.
** The Fordham Law Review relies on the author's translations for all Hebrew-language
sources.
1. Philip S. C. Lewis, Introduction to 1 LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE COMMON LAW
WORLD I (Richard L. Abel & Philip S. C. Lewis eds., 1988).
2. See id.; see also JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA passim (1976); MARC GALANTE & THOMAS PALAY,
TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 2 (1991)
(emphasizing the work of lawyers in big firms); LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES:
TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION passim (Robert L. Nelson et al.
eds., 1992); DIETRICH RUESCHEMEYER, LAWYERS AND THEIR SOCIETY: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN GERMANY AND IN THE UNITED STATES 1-26 (1973).
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between their duties to their clients and the often unclear or contradictory
values of democracy itself.3 This type of inquiry is largely theoretical (or
conceptual); it tries to assess the potential tension between professionalism
and democracy and how this tension can, or cannot, be ameliorated. From a
different, descriptive perspective one can look into what lawyers had
actually done (or are doing) to promote democracy or its underlying values.
Lucien Karpik and Terrence Halliday's Lawyers and the Rise of Western
Political Liberalism is a pathbreaking collection documenting lawyers'
practices along this line of thought.4 Yet from a third, normative point of
view we can ask if lawyers, qua lawyers, ought to practice in a way that
promotes democracy. And if so, why? And how? What are the
professional justifications for this stance? And how should they reconcile
their often contradictory public and private duties? 5
Despite the different lenses through which these lawyer-democracy
queries are posed, they all share a similar conceptual approach to the legal
profession. Whether prescriptive, descriptive, or normative, lawyers are
treated as a given, preexisting entity within democracy. Under all
approaches, lawyers are the ones that do (or do not), can (or cannot), ought
to (or ought not to) take part in shaping the democracies amidst which they
work. It is a unilateral trajectory; lawyers "are" of a particular form of
practice/ideology/ability/structure, whose impact upon democracy we
examine.
In this essay, I adopt a different presupposition to the legal profession,
and, in fact, my analysis proceeds in the opposite manner of the lawyer-
democracy conundrum. I start from democracy, focusing on state
institutions of a liberal democracy: legislature, judiciary, government,
and-to a certain extent-the market. Then I proceed to inquire how these
institutional settings influence the legal profession and partake in defining
its character and its societal roles.
The study of the legal profession through the forces of state and market is
not new, of course. It has occupied much of the literature examining the
profession from a historical-sociological perspective. 6  Magali Sarfatti
Larson has led the assertion that in the United States the market has been
3. Fred C. Zacharias, True Confessions About the Role of Lawyers in a Democracy, 77
FORDHAM L. REV. 1591, 1594 (2009). In the United States, lawyers owe an allegiance not
just to their clients, but also to the legal system as officers of the court. MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2007).
Rule 3.3 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
4. LAWYERS AND THE RISE OF WESTERN POLITICAL LIBERALISM (Terence C. Halliday &
Lucien Karpik eds., 1997).
5. Zacharias, supra note 3, at 1595.
6. See, e.g., Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Comparing Legal Professions Cross-Nationally:
From a Professions-Centered to a State-Centered Approach, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
415, 442 (noting the importance of state institutions in the study of "lawyers and law work").
Dietrich Rueschemeyer largely focuses on the structure of the profession and the type of
work lawyers do and less on the inner tension within the professional role. ld; see also
Lucien Karpik, Lawyers and Politics in France, 1814-1950: The State, the Market, and the
Public, 13 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 707, 707-36 (1988).
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the primary driving force behind lawyers' organization, and Gerald L.
Geison has argued that the state has dominated the development of the legal
profession in Europe. 7 However, most literature on this subject has focused
on the structural aspects of the profession (the number of lawyers in a
particular place, what they do, their work settings, who controls their
practice). Scholars and commentators have given less attention to the
impact of institutions in a liberal democracy on the normative/ethical basis
of lawyers' professional attributes-in other words, to their role in defining
and prioritizing lawyers' multiple commitments, in shaping their
professional ideology, and, in reconciling their often conflicting private and
public obligations. From this perspective, lawyers' "collective identity" is
constructed and molded by external forces as much as from within the
profession. 8
To be sure, democratic institutions, in and of themselves, are not static or
fixed entities. As essays in this volume demonstrate, despite historical
continuity, democracies are ever-changing and are in a constant state of
flux. Institutions gain strength or become weaker; they realign and are
supplanted by alternative structural configurations. Such transformations
lie at the heart of every live, vivid, and dynamic democratic polity. Moreso,
although my analytical departure point is the impact of these institutions on
the legal profession, I believe there is a mutual relationship such that
"lawyers" and "democracy" continuously influence and constitute each
other. Nonetheless, I believe there is value in switching the lens through
which we usually assess the lawyer-democracy tie, putting the spotlight on
lawyers as objects of change rather than its originator. This refocus allows
us to identify the dynamics under which certain institutional arrangements
shape the values underlying lawyers' work, and enables us to assess if they
live up to their professional aspirations.
To understand how lawyers can be influenced by democratic dynamics,
my research examines the legal profession in Israel. Israel is an interesting
case study due to the rapid changes that have occurred in the relations
between its democratic institutions in a relatively short period of time.
Within six decades, there have been notable fluctuations in the balance of
power between the legislature, the court, and government, and in general
between state institutions, civil society, and the market. These, in turn,
have had a direct impact on structural and normative aspects of the Israeli
legal profession.
Part I of this essay explains the paradigm through which I examine the
relationship between lawyers and democracy in Israel: regulation of the
profession. I am referring to regulation in its broadest terms; in other
words, the array of fundamental rules, rights, and duties that govern the way
7. MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS (1977); PROFESSIONS AND THE FRENCH STATE, 1700-1900 (Gerald L. Geison ed.,
1984); see also Rueschemeyer, supra note 6, at 442-46 (calling for carrying out a state-
centered analysis of the legal profession).
8. Karpik, supra note 6, at 735.
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the legal profession operates. Since each regulator is prone to prefer a
certain set of interests over others, the way lawyers are regulated can tell us
about how different institutions understand their role. Part II describes the
first era of lawyer regulation in Israel, characterized by professional
autonomy and self-regulation. During this period, from the establishment
of the state in 1948 until the mid-1980s, the bar and the bench were strongly
unified to protect the independence of the judiciary, and the Israeli bar was
freed of intervention from almost all state branches. Part III describes the
changes in this regulatory regime in the last three decades. As market
forces became the preferred site for resource allocation and the state turned
into a regulator rather than a provider of public goods, the market for legal
services, too, became a target for state regulation. The new regulatory
arrangement, although fragmented and incoherent, nevertheless reflects a
shift toward holding the legal profession more accountable to public ideals
rather than self-interest. Part IV illustrates this change through an
examination of a recent legislative amendment to lawyers' disciplinary
procedures. Part V discusses a case study: the courts' imposition of civil
liability upon lawyers toward unrepresented third parties. I conclude by
providing an initial assessment on the future of lawyer regulation in Israel,
as the profession becomes highly stratified, diversified, and specialized.
I. LAWYERS AND DEMOCRACY: THE QUESTION OF REGULATION
I explore the role of lawyers in the Israeli democracy through the
question of professional regulation. My main argument is that since the
1990s the Israeli legal profession has been undergoing a notable shift from
a strong regime of self-regulation to one of pluralistic regulation. Under
these emerging changes, lawyers' terms of practice are being reset and
determined by a multiplicity of external sources. Some are replacing self-
regulation and some operate in congruence with self-regulation. This shift
reflects a general tendency to strike a new balance between an Israeli
lawyer's commitment to public interest on the one hand, and self-interest on
the other-evidently strengthening the former.9
9. As is explained infra notes 28-29, many countries have employed anticompetitive
measures to counter the monopoly of lawyers' bars and to enhance competition in the market
for legal services. The most recent example is England's 2007 Legal Services Act. Legal
Services Act, 2007, c. 29. The goal of the Legal Services Act is to "reform[] the way legal
services in England and Wales are regulated and put[] the consumer interest at the heart of
the regulatory framework." See Ministry of Justice, Legal Services Act 2007,
http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/legalservicesbill.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2009); see
also Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29 (Eng.). See generally TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, BEYOND
MONOPOLY: LAWYERS, STATE CRISES, AND PROFESSIONAL EMPOWERMENT, at xiii (1987);
CHRISTINE PARKER, JUST LAWYERS: REGULATION AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE 38-41 (1999).
Most of these regulatory measures focus on preventing anticompetitive practices and
opening up the market for legal services. My inquiry reaches beyond the question of the
distribution of legal services and also examines the substantive norms that apply to lawyers
within professional practice, and how they are regulated. See, e.g., Benjamin H. Barton, An
Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should Control Lawyer Regulation-
Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REv. 1167 (2003).
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The way a particular society regulates its lawyers is telling of the way it
defines the profession's role as carrier and protector of a vital public
resource-law. Regulation also reflects the profession's relative strengths
and weaknesses vis-d-vis other institutions (within the state, the judiciary,
and the market), and the level of trust these institutions bestow upon the
organized bar to live up to its acclaimed public duties. 10
The questions relating to the regulation of lawyers can be divided into
three submatters. Although related, and at times overlapping, from an
analytical point of view it is useful to address them separately.
The first focuses on the market for legal services and inquires into the
allocation of legal resources. From this angle we examine who is entitled to
provide legal services and, from a regulatory perspective, who gets to
decide this. Most societies define a certain sphere of exclusive jurisdiction
in which only lawyers are permitted to provide legal services. This decision
has a direct impact on the availability of such services, and raises questions
about legal consciousness, litigiousness, and equal access to justice. Who
determines the boundaries of this professional jurisdiction is a site for
constant struggle between professions and external bodies."
The second question relates to the structural and organizational forms of
lawyers' activity. From this regulatory perspective we ask who determines
and imposes entry requirements on the profession; who promulgates and
enforces ethical codes; and who determines the relationship between
members of the legal profession and the organized bar. 12
The third aspect of legal regulation pertains to the substantive norms and
behavioral standards that lawyers must follow. Who defines lawyers'
fiduciary duties, professional competence, and duties to third parties; who
determines what behavior unbefitting a lawyer is? From a regulatory angle,
we inquire into the institutional arrangements that allocate the authority to
determine and enforce such norms. 13
Inquiring into lawyers' societal role through the question of regulation
allows us to study the profession from an internal and an external point of
view. The external perspective examines the legal profession's relationship
with the government/administration, legislature, courts, and market actors,
and assesses its status through the dynamics that take place between them.
10. On the connection between self-regulation and the critique against lawyers' self-
interest, see DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 143-44 (2000). See also Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation: The
Growing Economic Cost of Professional Control over Corporate Legal Markets, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 1689, 1690-91 (2008).
11. On the connection between regulation and access to justice, see PARKER, supra note
9, at 38-41; RHODE, supra note 10, at 19.
12. For a strong argument that lawyers' self-interest in self-regulation is manifested in
structural aspects of control, see AUERBACH, supra note 2, passim; Richard L. Abel, United
States: The Contradiction of Professionalism, in I LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE COMMON
LAW WORLD, supra note 1, at 186, 186-243.




This standpoint takes into account culture, history, and politics as
determinate factors in the continuous institutional power struggles of
lawyers within a given political environment. 14 Regulation is a site for such
struggle: lawyers' claim for self-regulation has been utilized to demand and
achieve autonomy and to minimize external intervention in setting lawyers'
terms of practice. Courts, in turn, have often imposed duties on lawyers
toward nonclients and third parties, even when they contradicted the bar's
traditional stands, by use of civil claims. 15 Legislatures have enacted
legislation that set heightened reporting standards for corporate lawyers.16
All these forms of direct and indirect regulation transform professional
duties and requirements. They often have distributive outputs and alter the
substantive rights of people who may be impacted by lawyers' work.
From an internal point of view, the regulation of lawyers touches upon an
inherent professional tension: client loyalty and public role. Lawyers must
act as zealous advocates for their clients and at the same time must serve as
officers of the court or the justice system at-large. 17  Balancing these
obligations sets the normative standards by which lawyers must abide,
demarcating the lines between client loyalty and public concern.
When we regulate something, we do so with some particular interests in
mind. Therefore, the entity that sets the standard for lawyers' conduct is
likely to do so according to its own incentives and viewpoint about the
proper weight of each interest.
With the risk of oversimplification, I suggest that lawyers' self-regulation
in Israel has strongly preferred clients' interests and lawyers' self-interests
over their duties to the public, to the courts, and to third parties. In other
words, self-regulation is strongly correlated with self-interest regulation. 8
To be sure, Israeli lawyers have always claimed that they serve the public
14. For examples of this approach, see AUERBACH, supra note 2, at 263-308; LARSON,
supra note 7; LAWYERS AND THE RISE OF WESTERN POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 4.
15. Wilkins, supra note 13, at 806 (claiming that, "[a]lthough bar leaders and others
have tried to separate 'malpractice' from 'discipline,' these efforts have been largely
unsuccessful"); Limor Zer-Guttman, Yitsug Mul Tsad Shekeneged Bilti Meyutsag-Yizaher
Orech Hadin [The Lawyer's Duty to Unrepresented Opposing Party: A Caveat], 1 DIN
UDVARIM 153 (2004) (Isr.).
16. Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton, Lawyers, Ethics and Enron, in ENRON:
CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 625, 648-52 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G.
Dharan eds., 2004).
17. As an advocate, a lawyer should act zealously to further a client's interests,
safeguard her secrets, avoid conflicts of interest, and in general abide by the client's will
regarding goals of the attorney-client relationship. As an officer of the court, a lawyer may
not assist a client in fraudulent behavior, unreasonably delay litigation, or act in any other
manner that is not candid toward the court.
18. See David Barnhizer, Profession Deleted: Using Market and Liability Forces to
Regulate the Very Ordinary Business of Law Practice for Profit, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
203, 225 (2004); Benjamin H. Barton, The ABA, the Rules, and Professionalism: The
Mechanics of Self-Defeat and a Call for a Return to the Ethical, Moral, and Practical
Approach of the Canons, 83 N.C. L. REv. 411, 419 (2005) (citations omitted); Randy Lee,
The State of Self-Regulation of the Legal Profession: Have We Locked the Fox in the
Chicken Coop?, 11 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 69 (2002).
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interest above their own-this has been necessary to maintain the
professional privileges they possess. Nonetheless, more often than not the
Israeli bar has professed strong self-interest as a central driving force
behind claims for self-regulation, despite cloaking them as furthering a
public interest. As Deborah Rhode explains,
The problem is not that bar policies are baldly self-serving. Lawyers and
judges who control regulatory decisions generally want to advance the
public's interests as well as the profession's. Rather, the difficulty is one
of tunnel vision .... No matter how well intentioned, lawyers and former
lawyers who regulate other lawyers cannot escape the economic,
psychological, and political constraints of their position. 19
Comparably, the legislature, the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), and the
courts in Israel have expressed a mixed record on balancing competing
interests and have tended to give the public's interest more value. These
institutions often consider themselves the best representatives of the justice
system as well as the public interest, better suited to protect the public from
the strong self-interest/client interest denoted by the bar. In Israel, too, the
emergence of multiple sources of regulation correlates with a tendency to
weaken self-interest of the bar and to give some preference to other
objectives.20
In sum, examining the legal profession through "the politics of
regulation" can offer a broad array of insight into the polity within which
lawyers work. Such an examination can tell us about the distribution of
legal resources and the allocation of rights, and is a unique angle through
which to learn about a society's engagement with lawyers as agents of law.
At this juncture, it is appropriate to spell out my normative viewpoint
about lawyers' role in a democratic society. My assumption is that lawyers
carry a heightened duty to protect democracy and its underlying values
beyond providing representation to individual clients and working out the
adversarial system. This is so because of the type of commodity they
handle-law. Law has a number of roles in a democracy, one of them
being the resolution of disputes in an orderly manner. For this purpose
lawyers can indeed claim that adversarial individual representation is the
way they further this objective. 21 But law also has other roles: inducing
behavioral patterns;22 facilitating transactions and maintaining order;23
19. RHODE, supra note 10, at 143-44.
20. On the correlation between self-regulation of ethical rules and a strong client-
centered approach, see Fred C. Zacharias, Integrity Ethics (Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 08-056, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1221722.
21. On the multiple roles of law see, for example, JOSEPH RAZ, The Functions of Law, in
THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 163 (1979).
22. In the criminal context, see, for example, CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND
PUNISHMENTS (Henry Paolucci trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1963) (1764); TOM R. TYLER,
WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
23. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
passim (1991).
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protecting vulnerable groups; and promoting equality (resource and power
distribution). 24 And since law is what lawyers do, lawyers cannot absolve
themselves of their societal role by furthering only one of law's functions. 25
In principle, this normative position about lawyers is not disputed, although
its extent and scope often is.26 Given this assumption, my essay will
continue to be descriptive in its nature; whatever definition we adopt of the
public-social role of lawyers, I believe it does not originate only from
within the profession (a self-defined "collective identity"), but is often
imposed upon lawyers by external bodies, through regulation.
1I. LAWYERS IN ISRAEL: THE FIRST ERA-SELF-REGULATION
Regulation of the Israeli legal profession has changed in the last two
decades from a rigid and expansive self-regulatory system toward
heightened intervention from multiple external sources. 27 To be sure, Israel
was not alone in introducing regulatory changes in the provision of legal
services, and many countries opted for reform by imposing
antimonopolistic and anticompetitive rules upon the bar. This oftentimes
resulted in deregulating the market for legal services, and in general
lessening state control over lawyers' practices. The underlying assumption
of such policies has been that ending monopolies and transferring the
24. For a complex view of law's weaknesses and strengths in promoting social change,
see, for example, GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008).
25. See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988); Robert
W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988); William H. Simon,
Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988).
26. In fact, lawyers have been criticized for having too much independence both from
the Right and the Left. For a claim against client dominance from the Right, see MONROE H.
FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 57 (1990) ("[T]he attorney acts
unprofessionally and immorally by depriving clients of their autonomy . . . by . . .
preempting their moral decisions or by depriving them of the ability to carry out their lawful
decisions."). See also Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the
Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976); Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's
Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 613. Answering the claims of client dominance from the Left, see William H. Simon,
The Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering: A Comment on Poverty Law Scholarship in the
Post-Modern, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1099, 1101 (1994).
27. Fred Zacharias claims that lawyers are and have been heavily regulated by external
sources, and therefore discussions regarding changes in regulatory regimes fall short of
acknowledging this complexity. See Fred C. Zacharias, The "'Self Regulation" Misnomer, in
REAFFIRMING LEGAL ETHICS: TAKING STOCK AND NEW IDEAS (Reid Mortensen et al. eds.,
forthcoming 2009); Fred Zacharias, The Myth of Self Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2009). At the risk of sounding defensive, and without commenting on the
debate in the United States, I will argue that in Israel self-regulation has indeed been the
norm, and this is now changing. Moreover, Zacharias wants us to see judicial oversight of
lawyers' ethical conduct as a form of external, rather than self-regulation. I agree that this
ought to be the consideration, but note that in Israel judicial oversight of misconduct is not
the norm. Rather, the Israel Bar Association is the body authorized to review and enforce
lawyers' conduct, not the courts.
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provision of legal services to the market will improve the allocation of
qualitative legal services. 28
It is doubtful whether competition theories have in fact led to more
equitable or qualitative access to justice. 29 In Israel, however, opening the
market for legal services to more competition was not the primary method
to tackle self-regulation. Rather the process has infused some
anticompetition measures aimed at eliminating anticompetitive actions
together with the imposition of public duties upon the profession through
direct and indirect regulation.
For decades, the Israeli-organized bar association had enjoyed almost
unparalleled power over lawyers' practices. Eli Salzberger has shown that
the bar association controlled most aspects of lawyers' practices. There is
only one bar association in Israel and membership is mandatory for all
lawyers. This bar association oversees apprenticeships and conducts
entrance exams; it promulgates ethical rules; it has been authorized by the
legislature to prosecute misconduct through disciplinary proceedings; and it
adjudicates unethical behavior through internal disciplinary boards.
External oversight has been extremely limited.30 Unauthorized Practice of
Law (UPL) rules are very broad, and almost all legal work is restricted to
lawyers. 31 Until the mid-1990s, anticompetition rules limiting internal and
external competition were prevalent. They included prevention of
solicitation, imposition of minimum fees, and prohibitions on advertising
and on practicing additional vocations parallel to lawyering. 32 This stable
monopoly remained unchallenged for at least three decades, since the
establishment of the state in 1948 until the mid-1980s. The bar association
encountered no dissent from within the profession, nor from the courts and
the state (legislature and government agencies).
During this era, the bar and the bench (mainly the Israeli Supreme Court)
created an aligned "front" vis-A-vis the state and its political apparatus.
Salzberger, Isaachar Rosen-Zvi, and I have demonstrated how the Israeli
Supreme Court provided broad support to the bar on the structural and
normative aspects of lawyers' organization and work. The court rarely
intervened in matters relating to the legal profession and endorsed most of
28. PARKER, supra note 9; Hadfield, supra note 10, at 1694.
29. PARKER, supra note 9, at 39.
30. Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Constructing Professionalism: The Professional Project of the
Israeli Judiciary, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 760, 780 (2001); Eli Salzberger, Kesher
Hamishpetanim Hayifraeli: Al Lishkat Orkhe Hadin Uba'ale Brita [The Israeli Jurists
Conspiracy: On the Israeli Bar and its Allies], 32 MISHPATIM 43 passim (2001) (Isr.); Neta
Ziv, Combining Professionalism, Nation Building and Public Service: The Professional
Project of the Israeli Bar 1928-2002, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1621, 1640-49 (2003).
31. Neta Ziv, Mi Heziz et Haglimah Sheli?-al Hasagat Gvul Miktsoa Arikhat Hadin
[Who Moved My Gown?-on Unauthorized Practice of Law in Israel], 24 MEHKERE
MISHPAT 439, 454-56 (2008) (Isr.).
32. Limor Zer-Guttman, Shmira al Kvod Hamiktsoa Vetadmito Ufirsomet Le'orkhe Din




the bar's policies and decisions. 33 The court accepted the bar's claim that
broad autonomy and self-regulation were legitimate and necessary to assure
qualitative delivery of legal services. This approach reinforced the
profession's broad autonomy and self-control, enshrined in legislation
promoted by the organized bar in early Israeli statehood.
In previous research, I have suggested that this relationship characterized
the first era of Israeli statehood, when the Supreme Court needed to
establish the judiciary's independence from state politics in an emerging
nation-state. The bar took part in this mission.34 The bench and the bar
carried a mutual interest to strengthen the autonomy of the legal
profession-judges and lawyers alike-as a means to strengthen the
independence of law in a new liberal democracy. From a sociological
perspective, the legal profession was a cohesive network. Judges and
lawyers were at social proximity-they belonged to similar social circles,
and an ethos of collegiality prevailed within their ranks. 35
As Gad Barzilai explains, during this era lawyers were not active or
outspoken on issues of public concern in any organized fashion. 36 They
took part in the larger project of nation building by remaining in the private
sphere, representing individual clients, and minding their own affairs. 37
Government and other public service lawyers (such as lawyers for the
Jewish Agency or the Jewish National Fund) played a significant part in
consolidating and legitimating state power (and the interests of the Jewish
majority therein) through legislation and regulation. 38  However, this
involvement encompassed only public/government lawyers. The majority
of lawyers in private practice remained, in the words of Barzilai, "with no
aspiration systematically to challenge the mobilisation of professional
knowledge for national purposes." 39 Nongovernment lawyers took no part
in the collective project of Jewish nation building, but they also did not play
a dissenting role as oppositional agents to state power. Lawyers did not
consider themselves (nor were they considered by others) as advocates for
33. Rosen-Zvi, supra note 30, at 780-82; Salzberger, supra note 30, at 79-84; Ziv,
supra note 30, at 1655-59.
34. Ziv, supra note 30, at 1651.
35. Rosen-Zvi, supra note 30, at 772.
36. Gad Barzilai, The Ambivalent Language of Lawyers in Israel: Liberal Politics,
Economic Liberalism, Silence and Dissent, in Fighting for Political Freedom: Comparative
Studies of the Legal Complex and Political Liberalism 247, 255 (Terence C. Halliday et al.
eds., 2007).
37. Id. at 267-68.
38. On the role of law in the nationalization process, see, for example, ETHNIC
FRONTIERS AND PERIPHERIES: LANDSCAPES OF DEVELOPMENT AND INEQUALITY IN ISRAEL
(Oren Yiftachel & Avinoam Meir eds., 1998); ISSACHAR RoSEN-ZVI, TAKING SPACE
SERIOUSLY: LAW, SPACE AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY ISRAEL (2004); Alexandre (Sandy)
Kedar, The Legal Transformation of Ethnic Geography: Israeli Law and the Palestinian
Landholder 1948-1967, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 923 (2001); Oren Yiftachel, Planning
as Control: Policy and Resistance in a Deeply Divided Society, 44 PROGRESS IN PLAN. 115
(1995).
39. Barzilai, supra note 36, at 254.
1772 [Vol. 77
REGULATION OF ISRAELI LAWYERS
the disenfranchised, nor as lawyer-statesmen. 40 Their role, similar to that
acknowledged in many emerging nation-states, was confined to importing
political liberalism and its underlying basic values: individualism,
separation of powers, and the formal guarantees of judicial independence
and the rule of law.
On their part, the Knesset, the Israeli legislature, and the government
revealed little interest in intervening in lawyers' affairs. The lack of state
regulation was part of broader sociopolitical arrangements and economic
structures of that time. The first decades in Israel were characterized by a
strong and centralized state, which delivered most essential public services
directly. Health, housing, employment, transportation, and infrastructure
development were provided through the state apparatus, rather than the
market. The absence of lawyers' regulation, thus, coincided with a polity in
which regulation of the private sphere was overall minimal and, in fact,
hardly wanting.
In sum, during the first era of Israeli statehood, lawyers had been
successful in positioning themselves-and the allocation of legal services in
general-in the private sphere. Consequently, they benefited from a
regulatory system that only rarely intervened in such private provisions.
The combination of a strong monopoly and an unregulated private sphere
shielded lawyers almost entirely from any type of regulation. The
organized bar held almost complete control over the internal structures of
the profession and the allocation of legal services, and had little to account
for in terms of lawyers' public duties and obligations. It had encountered
no dissent from within its ranks and no significant challenges from outside
agencies such as the state (the Knesset, the MOJ, or other government
bodies), the judiciary, or private entities (such as competitors in the
provision of legal services, insurance companies, and the like). This reality
began to change in the mid-1980s, to which I now turn.
III. SELF-REGULATION CHALLENGED
Changes in lawyers' regulatory regime are the outcome of a number of
factors that took place in Israel since the 1980s.
A. The Emergence of a Regulatory State
The political and economic reality described above changed dramatically
in the last three decades. Israel has shifted from a strong state-centered
economy to a privatized, globalized, and liberalized economy. This
preference for market allocation of public goods and services has emerged
in a broad array of social and economic areas, including the liberalization of
currency, financial institutions, and markets and in the privatization of
infrastructure development (such as road construction),
40. On the role of lawyer as statesman, see generally ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST
LAWYER: THE FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993).
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telecommunications, the labor market, welfare services (Wisconsin Plans),
healthcare (the erosion of universal health services and the rise of private
healthcare), land administration, public housing, and pensions and other
retirement plans.41 These economic policies favored competition and called
for the abolition of monopolies. Hence the monopoly held by the bar also
lost its clout. It was viewed with growing distrust and resentment, serving
the interests of its members on account of the general public. 42
In this context it is important to note that lawyers were not only
influenced by the liberalized and privatized globalizing economy in Israel,
but also took a direct role in its formation and expansion. As explained by
Barzilai, lawyers became agents in furthering, enabling, and sustaining
these economic changes and market activities. They facilitated financial
transactions, provided the necessary means for privatization, took part in
liberalizing foreign currency markets, built up financial institutions, and
globalized economic transactions. All this robust economic activity
benefited lawyers, whose work was almost exclusively located in the
private sphere. Lawyers benefited from Israel's economic growth because
growth increased the legal needs of corporate clients; thus, lawyers became
important vehicles of economic entrepreneurship and growth.43
The changes in Israel's political economy altered the basic relations
between the state, civil society, and market. The expansion of market
economy is typically accompanied by a rising level of state regulation, and
this phenomenon occurred in Israel as well. 44 Accordingly, the new
regulatory stance of the state-expanding intervention in market
activities-had a direct impact on lawyers. As the market became a central
source for delivery of (public) goods and services, and the state was
assigned a stronger regulatory function, it was only a matter of time before
new forms of regulation would reach the "market for legal services." The
economic landscape was therefore ripe for both market competition as well
as state regulation of a field previously shielded from intervention.
Inasmuch as economic transformations played an important role in the
regulation of Israeli lawyers, these transformations alone cannot explain the
changes to the regulatory system. Additional factors played out in this
process.
41. On the emergence of a regulatory state in Israel and privatization of public services
and goods, see, for example, ISRAEL: THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE AND CONTINUITY (David
Levi-Faur, Gabriel Sheffer & David Vogel eds., 1999); DAVID LEVI-FAUR, HAYAD HALO
NE'ELMAH: HAPOLITIKAH SHEL HATI'US BEYISRAEL [THE VISIBLE HAND: STATE-DIRECTED
INDUSTRIALIZATION IN ISRAEL] (2001) (Isr.). On the demise of state dominance in welfare
and labor, see Guy Mundlak, Hamishim Shanah Lehaf'alat Hok Habituah Haleumi:
Hahagigut Yitkaimu Bebet-Hamishpat [Fifty Years of the National Insurance Law: The
Celebrations Will Take Place in the Courthouse], 67 BITAHON SOTSIALI 83 (2004) (Isr.). On
the changes in the provision of health care, see Barzilai, supra note 36, at 253; Dani Filc,
The Health Business Under Neo-liberalism: The Israeli Case, 25 CRITICAL SOC. POL'Y 180,
180-97 (2005).
42. Ziv, supra note 31, at 484 n.138.
43. Barzilai, supra note 36, at 255; cf Hadfield, supra note 10, at 1695-96.
44. LEVI-FAUR, supra note 41, at 66-68.
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B. Jurisprudential Changes: More Law, More Lawyers
Since the 1990s, the Israeli legal profession has grown dramatically in
size. In 2006, the number of lawyers per capita in Israel was among the
highest in the world-one lawyer per 200 residents-and it is still on the
rise. From 1968 to 2005 the number of lawyers had increased by 1552%,
while the population grew by 246%. 45 The influx in the number of lawyers
has repeatedly been mentioned (by the general public and the state) as a
reason and justification for tighter control over the profession. The bar, it
has been argued, can no longer be solely trusted with handling such a
complex, diversified, and expansive professional body.
From a jurisprudential viewpoint, the growth in the size of the profession
came hand in hand with an overall "legalization" of Israeli society. Since
the mid-1980s, "rights talk" has been on the rise, alongside increasing
reliance on adjudication for addressing individual, social, and political
conflicts. The number of court cases, in all categories and all courts, has
risen at a much higher pace than demographic growth.
The legalization process has been twofold. First was the increasing turn
to the Supreme Court to resolve public interest/social change oriented
disputes that beforehand remained in the political, communal, or public
sphere. The legacy of this development is associated with Chief Justice
Aharon Barak and has drawn much controversy. 46 The second was the turn
to adjudication in individual/personal relations, as well as commercial
disputes. The findings above are true for both categories. 47 Much of this
process of legalization was itself led by jurists-judges and lawyers alike,
45. Barzilai, supra note 36, at 256-57. This growth is of grave concern to the bar, as it
has been attempting to curb this expansion and impose entry barriers into the profession, to
the point of asking the government to intervene and restrict the number of lawyers allowed
to practice. See Noam Sharvit & Ela Levi-Weinreb, 'Orekh-Din Bombach LeFriedman:
"Tokh Shanim Sfurot Yih'yu 50 Elef 'Orhke-Din Beyifrael; 'Atsor et Hatsafat
Hamushmakhim Hahadashim o She' efneh LeBaga "ts" [lan Bombach to Friedman: "In a
Few Years There Will Be over 50,000 Lawyers in Israel; Stop the Overflow of the New
Accredited or We Will Turn to the High Court of Justice"], GLOBES (Isr.), Sept. 3, 2008,
available at http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?QUID= 1056,U 1232915897801 &did =
10000378246; Noam Sharvit & Ela Levi Weinrib, Bombach Lebaga"ts: Horu Le~ar
Hamishpatim La 'atsor Hatsafat Miktso 'a 'Orkhe-Hadin-Min 'u Glishah Lemetsiut shel
50,000 'Orkhe-Din Beyirael [Bombach to the High Court of Justice: Order the Minister of
Justice to Stop Overflow of the Profession-Prevent the Flow of 50,000 lawyers into Israel],
GLOBES (Isr.), Oct. 26, 2008, available at http://www.globes.co.iI/news/article.
aspx?QUID=1055,U1232916919542&did=1000391563; Noam Sharvit & Ela Levi-Weinreb,
Shuk 'Arikhat Hadin Beyi.rael Ravui Bamishpatanim. Haim Tsarikh La'atsor et
Hahatsafah? Haim Kedai Lesgor Lifahot 3 Mikhlalot? [The Lawyers' Market in Israel Is
Saturated with Jurists. Should the Flow Be Stopped? Should at Least Three Law Colleges
Be Closed?], GLOBES (Isr.), Oct. 29, 2008, available at http://www.globes.co.il/news
/article.aspx?QUID=1056,U 1232917521105&did=l 000392316.
46. Gideon Sapir, The Israeli Constitutional Revolution-How Did It Happen? (Bar Ilan
Univ. Pub. Law Working Paper No. 08-02, 2008), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id= 1082230#.
47. See Barzilai, supra note 36, at 265-67.
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who created a demand for lawyers' services and broadened the scope of
judicial intervention.
Concomitantly, there has been a sharp increase in the number of students
entering law school in Israel. This in turn has triggered changes in the
supply of legal education. Similar to other countries, legal education is
considered a jumping board for professional development beyond legal
practice per se; but many Israeli law graduates take the bar exam, enter the
profession, and practice law at least temporarily.
Despite the proclaimed hardships of lawyers in small firms and of
individual practitioners who complain of a harsh competitive professional
market, the number of law students entering law schools has continued to
rise in the last decade. In 1996, six thousand students began their law
studies; in 2004, the number rose to fifteen thousand.48 The demand for
legal education was met with more liberalized state policies on the supply
side of legal education. Since 2005, Israel's Council for Higher Education
has approved the opening of three private law schools in the northern and
southern parts of the country, joining four research-based public law
schools, and five private colleges, altogether graduating over two thousand
law students per year.49 Many of these law school graduates belong to
social groups that had previously been excluded from the profession: new
immigrants, Arabs, Ultra Orthodox, and students from the periphery. This
diversification is no doubt a positive development. However, this rise in
numbers does not necessarily correlate with enhanced access to justice,
competence, or professional social responsibility. The growing number of
law students, in turn, triggered calls for tighter professional regulation.
This growing turn to law came about against rigid and restrictive rules on
Unauthorized Practice of Law in Israel. The law governing the provision of
legal services reserves lawyers' exclusivity in a broad scope of activities,
including provision of "legal advice," drafting of "documents of a legal
character," and representation before numerous judicial, administrative, and
quasi-judicial bodies. 50 The Israel Bar Association, on its part, has been
48. ISR. COUNCIL FOR HIGHER EDUC., STUDENTS IN INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION
BY LEVEL OF DEGREE, TYPE OF INSTITUTION AND FIELD OF STUDY tbl.10 [hereinafter ISR.
COUNCIL FOR HIGHER EDUC. 2004-05 DATA], available at http://www.che.org.il/download/
files/table 10.xls (last visited Feb. 18, 2009); ISR. COUNCIL FOR HIGHER EDUC., STUDENTS IN
INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION BY LEVEL OF DEGREE AND FIELD OF STUDY 1996, 2001,
2004-05, at tbl.9 [hereinafter ISR. COUNCIL FOR HIGHER EDUC. 1996, 2001, 2004-05 DATA],
available at http://www.che.org.il/download/files/table_9_3203.xls (last visited Feb. 18,
2009); see also Ofri Ilani, Hatstudentim Ma'difim Mishpatim Uvorkhim Mehigh-Tech [The
Students Prefer Law and Are Leaving High-Tech], HAARETZ (Isr.), Oct. 25, 2008, available
at http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/pages/ShArtjhtml?itemNo=1031250&contrasslD=&subC
ontrasslD=0&sbSubContrasslD=0.
49. According to the data of the Council for Higher Education, in 2006, 81% of law
students studied in private law colleges, as compared to 6.5% in 1996. ISR. COUNCIL FOR
HIGHER EDUC. 2004-05 DATA, supra note 48; ISR. COUNCIL FOR HIGHER EDUC. 1996, 2001,
2004-05 DATA, supra note 48. The new colleges that were approved were Haifa Law
College, Tzfat Law College in the Galilee, and Sapir Law College in the South.
50. Bar Association Act, 5721-1961, 15 LSI 196, 199 § 20 (1960-61) (Isr.). On the
Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules in Israel, see Ziv, supra note 31.
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enforcing UPL rules vigorously. It wants to ensure that the newly acquired
legal work remains within the jurisdiction of the legal profession. In doing
so it has relied on traditional claims of lawyer expertise and the need for
consumer protection. 5'
Accordingly, in order to take part in the resolution of disputes-
"legalized" under a stronger rights culture and against a robust rising
economy-reliance on lawyers became vital. On the one hand, Israelis
turned to law and to legal services in more areas of life; on the other hand,
only lawyers were authorized to provide such legal services. 52 If one
wanted to practice within the justice system, one needed to become a
lawyer. UPL laws account for the rise in the number of lawyers in Israel as
well.
Notwithstanding the expansion in the number of lawyers, law students,
and legal needs, and similar to evidence from other countries, there is no
proven link between the number of practicing lawyers and the equitable
availability of legal services or a higher level of professional competence or
social responsibility. As Christine Parker suggests, "It is naive to expect
the market in justice ever to be organized so efficiently that the majority
will be able to afford the services they need."' 53  On the contrary,
competition has often led to "races to the bottom," under which lawyers
adopted a stronger adversarial and client-centered approach in the hope that
this stance will be rewarded by clients' preferences. In Israel, too,
anecdotal evidence suggests that internal competition is a worry for the bar
due to the growing severity of the complaints about lawyer misconduct.54
51. Cf Richard Moorhead, Avrom Sherr & Alan Paterson, Contesting Professionalism:
Legal Aid and Non Lawyers in England and Wales, 37 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 765 (2003);
Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Lawyers, Non-Lawyers and Mediation: Rethinking the
Professional Monopoly from a Problem-Solving Perspective, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 235,
239 (2002); Deborah L. Rhode, The Delivery of Legal Services by Non-Lawyers, 4 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 209 (1990); Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A
Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L.
REv. 1 (1981).
52. Cf Hadfield, supra note 10 (discussing the connection between the profession's
control over the market for legal services and the rising reliance on lawyers for corporate
work).
53. PARKER, supra note 9, at 41 (providing information on discrepancies between
increased market competition for legal services and availability of lawyers, depending on the
type of service and clients); see also RHODE, supra note 10, at 118 ("For most Americans,
the most significant problem involves not too much but too little: too little access to justice
and too few choices about legal services and dispute resolution processes.").
54. The number of complaints against lawyers has not changed significantly between
1999 and 2004, and remains at an average of about 2700 complaints per year. See EFRAT
KAUL GRANOT, KNESSET RESEARCH & INFO. CTR., RiKuz NETUNIM AL HALIKHIM
MISHMATI'IM NEGED 'ORKHE DIN [DATA ON DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST LAWYERS]
(2004) (Isr.), available at http://www.knesset.gov.il/mmm/data/docs/m00767.doc. The Tel
Aviv Bar District Committee prosecutor has informed me, however, that in 2008 there was a
rise in the number of disciplinary indictments filed against lawyers in the Tel Aviv district,
the largest in the country. Interview with Amos Weitzman, Head Prosecutor, Tel Aviv Bar
Ass'n Dist. Comm. (Nov. 16, 2008). The average of disciplinary indictments has been about
200 per year, and for 2008 it is expected to be around 250. In addition, his impression is that
a growing number of lawyers are involved in unbefitting behavior that he relates to growing
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Legal needs of the poor are not met by the growing number of lawyers
entering the profession. 55
Thus the "explosion in litigiousness," as it is often called, and the failure
of lawyers to adapt the availability and quality of their services to growing
legal needs have served as additional incentives for tighter regulation of the
market for legal services, lawyers included. 56
C. Institutional Realignment of the State, the Bench, and the Bar
A different kind of change that ought to be accounted for in order to
understand the transformation in the regulation of lawyers in Israel is the
notable rift between the bench and the bar. This schism had developed over
the last two decades, and should be understood as part of a broader
institutional realignment of the bar, the state (the Knesset and the MOJ),
and the judiciary. Under this new institutional order, it is no longer possible
to identify a unified or stable alliance among these institutions. Rather,
there is a shifting, ad-hoc positioning among them, representing the
contingent and nonhomogenous nature of these bodies.
The disengagement between the bench and the bar-a stark change from
past affinity--can be perceived through a variety of venues. A notable one,
for example, has been the bar's project of "Judges' Review," a
questionnaire distributed to lawyers asking them to evaluate judicial
performance, initiated in 2001. The project was met with fervent
opposition from the judiciary. In 2002, a crisis broke out between the
judges and the bar, which included a "ban" imposed by the judges on
participating in activities organized by the bar, with mutual accusations in
competition: no-show for court hearings (due to duplicate scheduling), submission of
motions without getting the consent of the opposing party, and use of language unbefitting a
lawyer. Id. There is also a growing number of lawyers involved in criminal investigations,
some of which are severe (e.g., drug smuggling, connections to organized crime).
Additionally, more lawyers are accused of offenses that are economic in nature (e.g., writing
checks without financial coverage). Id. Although this data is anecdotal at this stage of the
research, it does indicate some correlation between the growing competition and unethical
behavior.
55. There is no official research on the legal needs in Israel. Information on the
availability of legal services to the poor, however, illustrates a growing want in this area. See
YIFAT SHAI, KNESSET RESEARCH & INFO. CTR., GuFIM HAM'ANIKIM SIU'A MISHPATI BELO
TASHLUM LEMEUTE YEKHOLET [BACKGROUND PAPER FOR DISCUSSION: BODIES PROVIDING
FREE LEGAL SERVICES TO PEOPLE WITH LIMITED MEANS] (2004) (Isr.) (noting the rise in
people requesting state legal assistance as well as assistance from nongovernmental
organizations between 2001 and 2003); see also Knesset, Committee of Public Complaints
Protocol of Proceedings: Pniyot Tsibur shel Anashaim Hazkukim Lesiyua Mishpati Ve'ein
Be'efsharutam Lemamno [Public Inquiries of People in Need of Legal Services Who Cannot
Afford to Pay] (2004), available at http://www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/data/html
/zibur/2004-03-17.html (discussing the immense unmet legal needs that are not addressed by
the state, the bar, and civil society).
56. On similar trends in the United States and other countries, see RHODE, supra note 10,
at 120-25.
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the press. Although the heat over this particular conflict has now subsided,
it signaled the dynamics of a new era. 57
Alliances between politicians (members of the Knesset and government
officials) and lawyers on the controversial topic of the Israeli Supreme
Court's acclaimed "activism" illustrate another realignment of this sort.
Since the late 1990s, the Supreme Court has been under growing political
(and academic) condemnation due to accentuated "judicial activism" led by
then-Chief Justice Barak. The critics, who had challenged the alleged
inflated jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and had criticized the growth of
its institutional power, were mainly politicians-Knesset members as well
as government ministers. However, they were often supported by members
of the bar (or some of its more vocal members), as well as members of the
legal academy. 58 This repositioning on crucial issues of the justice system
signals a grave transformation from previous ties between lawyers and
judges, ties that were based on mutual protection and support, united vis-d-
vis the state.
The legislature has increased its intervention into lawyers' affairs as well.
Both the Knesset and the MOJ have demonstrated a clear proactive
approach toward lawyers' regulation. Contrary to negligible legislative
activity in the previous era, the Israeli parliament, the Knesset, and the MOJ
have introduced numerous legislative initiatives pertaining to the bar and to
lawyers' affairs. More than once legislation was proposed, and later
adopted, despite the strong objection of the bar. At times, legislation of this
sort targeted professional activity directly (for example, a legislative
amendment imposing structural reform on the bar's disciplinary
proceedings, or an amendment to allow non-Israeli lawyers to practice in
Israel under certain conditions). 59 In other matters, legislation related to
issues in which lawyers had vested interests and was adopted despite the
bar's strong objection. For example, an amendment to the Execution Act
was passed limiting the imposition of civil imprisonment for debt despite
the bar's vehement opposition voicing the interests of strong creditors. 60
State agencies have also adopted a more critical approach to lawyers'
professional standards. The Israeli Securities Exchange Authority, for
57. Barzilai, supra note 36, at 266; Salzberger, supra note 30.
58. Barzilai, supra note 36, at 267.
59. On this point, see Mark Schon, Bil'adi: Se'if Behok Hahesderim 2009 Yeafsher
Leorkhe Din Zarim Lifol Ba 'arets [Exclusive: A Section in the 2009 Arrangement Act Will
Permit Foreign Lawyers to Work in Israel], CALCALIST (Isr.), Aug. 6, 2008, available at
http://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3100185,00.html (describing the bar's
objection to a legislative amendment that would allow non-Israeli lawyers to practice in
Israel).
60. The bill was passed on November 4, 2008, after five years of legislative debate. The
amendment limits the circumstances in which civil imprisonment can be imposed on debtors
and provides better protections to debtors who are unable to pay debts. The Israeli Bar
Association was one of the most rigorous opponents to this reform, and some of the
objections posed by the bar were incorporated into law. However, the bar could not hinder




example, has attempted to heighten the duties of in-house counsel in public
corporations trading in the Securities Exchange, expecting them to serve as
gatekeepers against corporate financial fraud. 6' The CEO of Israel's
Securities Exchange Authority expressed this view clearly, telling lawyers,
"[Y]ou-legal counselors-both internal and external-are in my view
gatekeepers, you are non-frivolous elements in the control mechanisms that
ensure the cleanliness of the financial markets .... ."62 Needless to say, the
bar association rejects this view outright, placing client confidentiality as a
trumping interest over and above all others. Similarly, the Israel Money
Laundering Prohibition Authority has also expressed its intentions to
expand the duties imposed on lawyers to report financial irregularities and
violations of this law, narrowing the scope of lawyer-client confidentiality.
The bar association, not surprisingly, opposes these proposals. 63
All of these changes occurred as the bar association itself came under
growing criticism from within its rank and file, beginning in the 1990s. 64
As the number of lawyers increased, the profession became highly
diversified and stratified. Internal rivalries emerged, and lawyers became
more outspoken against the organized bar. Some lawyers initiated legal
proceedings challenging the bar's restrictive practices, while others
demanded that it become more accountable to public concerns. The debate
over the establishment of a pro bono program in 2002 illustrates this
schism. While the bar's leadership at the time vowed to set up a voluntary
pro bono program, there were segments within the organization that
strongly objected to this initiative. 65 It was no longer possible to talk about
the interests of a homogenous profession, as special interest groups-young
lawyers, personal injury lawyers, Arab lawyers, gay and lesbian lawyers, to
mention a few organized groups-brought forth divergent positions of
lawyers' professional ideology.
Against this backdrop, the legal profession-judges, lawyers, legal
academia-no longer stands as a unified front vis-A-vis the state and the
political apparatus. The traditional affiliation between the bench and the
bar has been replaced by a more nuanced and tentative relationship, which
designates a new role to the state and reallocates power among the three
branches of government under the stronger influence of market forces.
Under the new order, these institutional actors are neither in total alignment
61. See, for example, the head of the Israel Securities Authority, Moshe Tant, in a
Continuing Legal Education talk, in which he defined lawyers primarily as gatekeepers of
the law and markets, not protectors of client confidentiality. Moshe Taft, Shomre Saf
Beta 'agidim Medavhim [Gatekeepers in Corporations Are Reporting], NFC NEWS, Nov. 22,
2006, available at http://www.nfc.co.il/Archive/003-D- 19087-00.html?tag=23-41-45.
62. Id.
63. See Itai Har-Or, Orekh-Din Tel-Tsur: "Hok Isur Halbanat Hon Lo Hevi Letsimtsum
Irgune Hapeshiah" [Tel Tzur: "The Laundering Prohibition Act Has Not Harmed Criminal
Organizations "], CALCALIST (Isr.), Sept. 23, 2008, available at
http://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3122622,00.html.
64. Ziv, supra note 30, at 1659, 1661-62.
65. Id. at 1665.
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nor in overall contestation or contention. They side with each other in some
areas, depending on perceived interests and political considerations. This is
a fractured, fragmented positioning, in which discrete linkages on ad hoc or
limited bases are formed, while in other areas, the institutions differentiate
and assume opposing stands.
These shifts are expressed through, as well as influenced by, changes in
the regulation of lawyers (or lawyering regulations or standards). The past
affinity between the bench and the bar was reinforced by a particular
regulatory arrangement: an autonomous bar and broad self-regulation. In
contrast, the fragmented and nuanced alliances described above are also
reflected in lawyers' regulatory arrangements that, in turn, are not coherent
and stable. On some counts the Supreme Court has been wholly supportive
of the bar and its interests. Such have been the Supreme Court rulings
dismissing challenges to the bar's monopoly, to mandatory membership and
fees, and to challenges of UPL rules. 66 On other issues, the same court
operated as a practical regulator, setting substantive normative professional
standards that sharply differ from those accepted by the bar. Such was the
case when the Supreme Court invalidated an ethical rule that restricted
clients from switching lawyers pending a fee dispute,67 or cases, discussed
infra Part III, in which the court imposed heightened fiduciary duties upon
lawyers toward third parties and toward the court.
Altogether, these moves illustrate an incremental, nonlinear, and
fragmented intrusion into the bar's well-entrenched autonomous system of
self-regulation. The moves have not been uniformly coordinated. They
take place in a piecemeal manner, rather than through a comprehensive
"top-down" reform. Overall the Israeli bar is still quite powerful and
lawyers still hold much control over their own affairs; at present the bar is
able to discard all-encompassing structural regulatory reforms. Changes in
regulations and in the redefinition of the public and private duties of
lawyers have therefore been taking place through "bottom-up,"
multidimensional, and encroaching patterns that challenge well-established
regulatory arrangements.
Overall, however, and despite its fragmented nature, the emergence of a
new regulatory framework is not merely a structural change; it reaches
beyond a shift in relative powers of the profession, the state, the judiciary,
and the market. I suggest that it signifies an attempt to redefine lawyers'
professionalism-to strengthen their public functions and enhance their
societal duties. The new regulatory framework aims to do so in all
dimensions described above: allocation of legal resources, entry barriers to
practice, structural and organizational conditions of practice, and lawyers'
substantive norms and standards of behavior.
66. On the monopoly of the bar, mandatory membership, and fees, see HCJ 2334/02
Shtangar v. Knessset Chair [2003] IsrSC 58(1) 786. On reaffirming the restrictions on the
ethical rule prohibiting lawyers from working with nonlawyer entities, see HCJ 9596/02
Pitsuy Nimrats v. Minister of Justice [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 792.
67. HCJ 4330/93 Ganem v. Isr. Bar Ass'n Tel Aviv Dist. [1996] IsrSC 40(3) 221.
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The next parts exemplify this process by an analysis of two cases: (i)
legislation implementing changes in disciplinary proceedings of the bar;
and (ii) liability rules developed by civil courts imposing heightened
fiduciary obligations upon lawyers toward nonclient third parties.
IV. DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AND PROFESSIONAL AUTONOMY
One of the central aspects of professional self-regulation is control over
discipline. Disciplinary proceedings constitute an institutional venue for
supervising, monitoring, and setting norms of behavior for a designated
group-in our case, lawyers. In the case of the Israeli bar, disciplinary
proceedings have always been considered a central site for exerting
professional independence. Thus, the identity of the body authorized to
regulate lawyers' behavior, set its standards, and enforce them continues to
be of central importance.
Before the enactment of the Israel Bar Association Act (IBA Act) in
1961, disciplinary proceedings were under the jurisdiction of the courts. As
membership in the lawyers' association was voluntary, sanctions against
lawyers who departed from accepted behavioral norms could not be
mandated by the organized profession. Only those lawyers who opted to
become members of the Jewish Lawyers' Association were subject to its
jurisdiction. 68 In 1961, as part of the comprehensive legislative move to
establish a unified bar with extensive control over lawyers' affairs,
membership in the bar association became mandatory, 69 and the bar was
authorized to administer entrance exams and to regulate admittance of
apprentices to the profession. 70  In addition, lawyers demanded and
received exceptionally broad authority to determine and enforce
professional behavioral standards.
Until the 2008 reform, discussed in this section, the bar's control over
ethical rules covered all stages of the disciplinary process: promulgation of
ethical rules (through the bar's legislative body, the National Council), 7 1
initiation of disciplinary proceedings (the bar's District and Central
Committees), 72 adjudication of disciplinary proceedings (regional and
national disciplinary boards), 73 and punishment. 74 Eli Salzberger claims
68. Ziv, supra note 30.
69. Israel Bar Association Act, 5721-1961, 15 LSI 196, 202 § 42 (1960-61) (tsr.),
amended by Amendment to Israel Bar Association Act (no. 7), 5731-1971, 25 LSI 173, 174
(1970-71) (Isr.).
70. Id. §§ 39-40 (entry exams) (amended 1971); id. §§ 26-37, 41, 41A (amended 1971)
(apprenticeship).
71. Id §§ 53-63, 109.
72. Id. § 63. Although parallel authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings has been
granted to the Attorney General and to the State Prosecutor, these officials rarely make use
of their prosecutorial power.
73. Id. §§ 14-18.
74. Id. §§ 68-69.
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that such an expansive control over lawyers' behavior is unprecedented in
comparative standards. 75
Adjudication of disciplinary proceedings has taken place with very little
external oversight. Members of the regional and national disciplinary
board-that is, lawyers only-were appointed by the bar association. No
public representatives were involved in their appointment or took part in
adjudicating disciplinary proceedings. As a matter of practice, members of
the disciplinary boards were appointed by the bar's regional committees
according to lists that had been agreed upon by opposing sections of the
bar, with no public oversight or review.76 This method of appointment
exposed the process to severe political manipulation and influence.
The decisions of the bar's disciplinary boards could be appealed to the
Supreme Court, sitting as a court of appeals. However, only a small
percentage of cases reached this stage. Overall, the disciplinary system had
been highly controlled by lawyers, with very limited external or public
checks.
This closed system was reinforced by a number of additional
qualifications: the disciplinary hearings were not open to the public and
were held in closed camera; 7 7 the decisions of the courts were not published
and could not be accessed by interested parties or the public; and the most
severe punitive measures imposed by the court (suspension of license and
expulsion from the bar) were automatically stayed pending an appeal.78 In
sum, despite some outlets to extraprofessional checks, the system on the
whole operated in a self-contained manner, to an extent foreign even to
similar professional systems that enjoy a relatively high level of self-
regulatory privileges. 79
It is therefore not surprising that the public image of lawyers' self-
enforcement practices suffered from low esteem: disciplinary proceedings
were often criticized as being unfair, arbitrary, and politicized, from an
internal and an external perspective. From within, they were too closely
tied to the everlasting rivalries within the bar; from the outside, these
proceedings were not effective in policing the most severe deviances and
were not enforced evenhandedly.8 0
75. Salzberger, supra note 30; see also LIOR BEN DAVID, THE KNESSET RESEARCH &
INFO. CTR., TIPUL BE'AVEROT MISHMA'AT SHEL ORKHE DIN: MABAT MASHVE [THE
TREATMENT OF LAWYERS' DISCIPLINARY OFFENCES: COMPARATIVE LOOK] (2004) (Isr.)
[hereinafter KNESSET DISCIPLINARY REVIEW DOCUMENT], available at http://www.
knesset.gov.il/mnmn/data/docs/m00920.doc.
76. Pursuant to the Israel Bar Association Act, members of the disciplinary boards are
elected by lawyers in general regional elections. 15 LSI §§ 14-15. De facto, the board
members were chosen and appointed from a list, which was agreed upon by different
segments of the bar.
77. The disciplinary court could decide to permit the presence of third parties or to open
the court, but as a matter of course the hearings were held in camera. NAT'L BAR ASS'N R. 73
(Isr. Bar Ass'n).
78. See Id. R. 72.
79. See KNESSET DISCIPLINARY REVIEW DOCUMENT, supra note 75.
80. See Ziv, supra note 3 1, at 483-84.
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This broad self-regulatory arrangement remained for decades, despite
occasional critique and grievances aired in the media or in public debates. 81
In the mid-1990s, however, winds began to change. In 1994 then-Minister
of Justice David Libai appointed a committee chaired by retired District
Court Justice Shaul Aloni to review the bar's disciplinary procedures and
propose revisions to them. 82
In 1996, a group of lawyers petitioned the Israeli Supreme Court,
challenging the bar's practice of appointing judges to the disciplinary
boards from agreed-upon lists instead of holding open elections. The
Supreme Court rejected the petition, but voiced concern over the current
procedure, stating that it was flawed and should undergo legislative
change.83
In 1996, a group of Knesset members introduced a private bill of
legislation to change the way judges are appointed to the disciplinary
boards. In 1999, the State Comptroller issued a report on the bar's
disciplinary courts, expressing disapproval of the appointment system that
had included candidates from "a closed circle" of members and presently
remains susceptible to political manipulation. The Comptroller's report
noted that in most countries, disciplinary hearings are not under the
exclusive control of the relevant bar and recommended opening up the
proceedings to broader public involvement and review. 84
In 2004, the Knesset Research and Information Center published a report
on the bar's disciplinary proceedings, noting its anomalous self-regulatory
powers from a comparative perspective.85 Around the same time, some
members of legal academia started writing critically about the bar's
extensive powers, including on the topic of disciplinary proceedings. 86
81. Id.
82. This committee followed a preceding committee appointed by Minister of Justice
David Libai in October 1993 and headed by retired Supreme Court Justice Yaakov Maltz,
which looked only partially into the bar's disciplinary proceedings but commented on their
low prestige and problematic status. COMPTROLLER, DUH 'AL HABIKORET BELISHKAT 'ORKHE
HADIN BEYI RAEL [REPORT ON THE REVIEW OF THE ISRAEL BAR ASSOCIATION] (1999) (Isr.)
[hereinafter COMPTROLLER REPORT ON THE ISRAEL BAR ASSOCIATION], available at
http://80.70.129.40/docs/lawyers.rtf.
83. HCJ 1302/96 Indep. & Change Faction v. Tel Aviv Reg'l Council of the Bar Ass'n
[1996] lsrSC 50(3) 749. Chief Justice Aharon Barak commented,
The Central Committee [of the bar] is the prosecutor before the disciplinary court.
Is it proper that the prosecutor will, de facto, determine the membership of the
disciplinary court in its district? The regional committee reflects the internal
politics of the bar. Is it not appropriate that choosing the judges should be
excluded from such politics? It seems that there is place to consider changing the
law, in a manner that the judges in the disciplinary court will be elected by an
appointment committee, similar to election of justices and (religious court) judges.
The committee will consider the qualification of each candidate, and will surely
appoint the best. The election of judges will be taken away from the "political"
struggles of the bar and from the local "politics" of the region.
Id. at 757.
84. COMPTROLLER REPORT ON THE ISRAEL BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 82, at 17-23.
85. KNESSET DISCIPLINARY REVIEW DoCUMENT, supra note 75.
86. See, e.g., Salzberger, supra note 30; Zer-Guttman, supra note 32; Ziv, supra note 30.
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At first, the bar tried to halt and defy this wave of challenges to its well-
entrenched practices and privileges. It managed to stall legislative reforms
for some years, advocating within the MOJ and aligning support among
lawyer Knesset members who had held positions in the bar association
beforehand. Around 2002, the MOJ started to take the lead on furthering
the legislative reform, focusing on disciplinary hearings. The MOJ
gradually became the main opposition to the bar. Amendment Number 32
to the Israel Bar Association Act turned into a government-supported bill,
led by jurists within the MOJ's legislative department.
This move constituted a stark change in the MOJ's policy compared to its
past convention, which had been passive and weak in challenging the bar's
extensive powers. It soon became clear to the bar that the organization had
lost the ability to stop legislative reform altogether. The bar encountered
strong and persistent challenges from government officials, who exhibited a
distrustful attitude toward the bar, openly doubting its proclaimed
motivations as a guardian of the public interest, rather than its own.
Therefore, the bar set its mind on securing the best arrangement possible
under the new emerging political and legislative order.
Amendment Number 31 to the IBA Act was submitted to the Knesset in
2004.87 It took three more years for the bill to come before the legislature
again, following a series of negotiations between the MOJ and the bar.88
When the bill reached final deliberations in the Knesset Constitution, Law,
and Justice Committee (CLJC), the parameters of the reform had already
been agreed upon. On the one hand, the grand move of legislative
intervention in an arrangement that had been in place for almost forty years
was no longer contested. On the other hand, it was also settled that overall
disciplinary proceedings would remain within the bar's jurisdiction and
would not be turned over to external bodies. In this sense, the bar managed
to preserve a significant part of its power over policing lawyers but had to
give up exclusivity and control at a number of crucial junctions.
In the fall of 2008, the Knesset CLJC renewed its hearings on the bill in
preparation for its final reading. In the next part, I analyze these
deliberations, which exemplify the struggle over control and turf between
the Knesset, the state (MOJ), and the bar. As illustrated below, one cannot
identify a stable or apparent alliance among these bodies: at times the
Knesset members exhibited strong support for the government's position,
expressing concern over the vast powers afforded to the bar; in other
instances Knesset members sided with the bar, understanding its worries
over extensive government control over the legal profession. Obviously the
87. Amendment to the Israel Bar Association Act (no. 31), 2004, S.H. 745 (Isr.).
88. Deputy Attorney General Joshua Schoffman explained during the first hearing of the
bill in the Knesset Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee (CLJC) that the delay was
caused due to attempts of the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) to reach an agreement with the bar.
He described the bill as a version that overall had earned the support of the bar, which at that
point did not object to a legislative reform but differed in its content and details. Protocol




judiciary was not present in this process, but as the bill included (at some
point in time) a designated role for the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
the politics of the court, described above, found their way into discussions
on the bar's jurisdiction.
As expected, the final version of the law, which was legislated in June
2008, struck a balance between these competing interests and viewpoints.
It can be argued that the bar's accomplishments are far greater than the
public interest demands. On the other hand, the process per se seems to be
an important precedent: a comprehensive reform forced upon the bar from
the outside. 89 My analysis examines the discourse during the legislative
deliberations in order to point out the means by which this new balance was
achieved. The following are a number of issues that drew heated debates
during the disciplinary proceeding hearings of the Knesset CLJC.
A. Establishment of a Nominating Committee for Disciplinary Judges
All sides agreed that the current arrangement under which judges are
appointed to the disciplinary board is flawed, and that a nominating
committee (NC) ought to appoint judges to the district national disciplinary
boards. There were harsh disagreements, however, on numerous basic
questions relating to this committee, chief among them the following:
" Who will chair the NC? 90
* Who will appoint the Chair of the NC? 91
* Who will appoint the Chair of the disciplinary bench?92
89. The bar's chair of the Ethics Committee, attorney Dror Arad Ayalon, described the
amendment as "important," underscoring the fact that the bar did retain most of the control
over disciplinary proceedings. Dror Arad Ayalon, Hareformah Bedin Hamashm'ati [The
Reform in the Disciplinary Law], ETTIKA MIKTSU'IT, July 2008, at 1, 1-2.
90. The bar itself asked that the chair of the Nominating Committee (NC) be chosen
from the existing judges of the disciplinary boards, a position objected to by the MOJ and
rejected by the Knesset due to the majority of bar representatives in the NC. Protocol 328,
supra note 88, at 4, 8. The Knesset preferred a retired justice, preferably a retired Supreme
Court justice. Id. at 21-22. The arrangement adopted designated either a retired Supreme
Court justice or a retired president of a District Court Justice to chair the NC. Amendment to
the Israel Bar Association Act (no. 32), 2008, S.H. 597 § 18D(a)(1) (lsr.).
91. The MOJ asked for this position to be held by the MOJ, but the bar objected
strongly. Protocol 328, supra note 88, at 6 (attorney Mozer expressing concern over the
"taking over" of the process by "the state"). The Knesset members suggested that the Chief
Justice hold this position. The final decision gave this power to the Minister of Justice, in
consultation with the head of the bar association. 2008, S.H. 597 § 18D(a)(l).
92. The bar wanted the District Disciplinary Court to choose its own president and the
Central Committee of the bar to appoint the president of the National Disciplinary Court; the
MOJ objected, asking that the presidents be appointed by the NC. Protocol 340 of the
Knesset Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee 44-47 (Nov. 14, 2007) (Isr.) [hereinafter
Protocol 340]; Protocol 567 of the Knesset Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee 5
(June 15, 2008) (Isr.) [hereinafter Protocol 567]. The final arrangement gave the power to
the judges, with the approval of the NC. 2008, S.H. 596 § 18D(a)(1).
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* What percentage of the membership of the NC will be
appointed by the bar?93
* Will the state have a designated number of members that it
can appoint to the NC from within the civil service? 94
* Will the NC need a special majority for its decisions?95
Analyzing the discussions on these matters reveals a political struggle on
the boundaries of the bar's autonomy, as well as the extent of external
control over the central change introduced by the bill-taking away the
exclusive power to appoint judges from the bar. Although the bar agreed to
the principle of change, it wanted to preserve as much control as possible in
the new deal.
B. Establishment of Statutory Ethics Committees
Another central change proposed by the bill was the establishment of
statutory regional and national ethics committees. These committees would
be vested with prosecutorial powers to bring disciplinary charges against
lawyers, as well as to issue prerulings upon request. The membership on
these committees drew heated debates on the following points:
* Will nonlawyers serve on the ethics committees? 96
" Will jurists who are not practicing lawyers be allowed to
serve on the ethics committees? 97
* Will there be a paid position to coordinate and implement
the work of the ethics committees? 98
93. Before the hearings it was agreed that the bar would appoint four out of seven
members of the NC. 2008, S.H. 598 § 18D(a)(3)-(4).
94. The bar strongly objected to having "designated" members, chosen by the civil
service, fearing they would form opposition with the members of the bar. The position of
the MOJ was adopted. Id. § 18D(a)(2).
95. The MOJ's request for a special majority (five out of seven) was not accepted.
Protocol 340, supra note 92, at 22. The bar stated that there was a "trade-off': the MOJ's
position was accepted as a reappointment of the NC chair, therefore the MOJ should prevail
on the special majority request. Id. at 21-22.
96. The bar strongly objected to the possibility that nonlawyers would staff the ethics
committees, and its position was accepted.
97. The bar also strongly objected to nonactive members of the bar (such as retired
judges, members of academia, jurists from civil service, etc.) serving on the ethics
committee. The debate on this point was long and principled. The bar's position was
rejected, and the arrangement adopted allowed a number of nonactive members of the bar to
serve on these committees. Protocol 401 of the Knesset Constitution, Law, and Justice
Committee 16 (Jan. 1, 2008) (Isr.) [hereinafter Protocol 401].
98. The bar objected to establishing this paid position; its position was not accepted.
2008, S.H. 597 § 18C; Protocol 476 of the Knesset Constitution, Law, and Justice
Committee 1-18, 35-45 (Feb. 26, 2008) (tsr.) [hereinafter Protocol 476]; Protocol 416 of the




The debate over the ethics committees' authority was extremely lengthy.
It touched upon the core issue at stake: Who will control the determination
of normative ethical and behavioral standards of lawyers, through bringing
charges as well as through a preruling procedure? The Chair of the CLJC,
Member of the Knesset (MK) Ben Sasson, who generally took a strong
stand against the anticompetitive position of the bar, expressed his
sentiments on this question: "I know of no other public organization in
Israel that has a statutory status similar to the bar. The public gave you this
status, the public must be a participant. The public makes your law, backs
you up, let the public sit there." 99
In general, the bar attempted to keep the shop closed as much as possible
for its membership. It not only objected to appointment of nonlawyers to
the ethics committees but also to jurists who were not active members of
the bar, such as retired judges, or in civil service. On this point, the bar's
position was rejected and the MOJ's accepted. The Knesset turned down,
however, the MOJ's request to designate a quota for public service and state
lawyers on the ethics committees, drawing critique from MK Itshak Levi,
stating that "[r]epresentatives of the state have no advantage on issues of
ethics."' 00 As for the proposal to appoint a lawyer in a paid position to
coordinate and implement the work of the ethics committees, the bar
objected to this new position, arguing for the professional interests of
participation and democracy. The bar's proclaimed concern was that the
disciplinary proceedings would become too formal and professionalized,
losing their collegial, informal nature. The MOJ, whose position was
accepted on this point, wanted the exact opposite: more professionalized,
standardized, and transparent proceedings.
C. Abolishment of Procedural Privileges
The arrangements that afforded lawyers exceptional privileges
throughout disciplinary proceedings were for the most part abolished. The
bill established that the proceedings would be held in open court and that
punitive measures (expulsion and suspension) would apply immediately
unless stayed by a court order. In addition, appeal to the Supreme Court on
rulings of the disciplinary courts was replaced with a review by a district
court, as is commonly the norm in similar procedures.
On its own, the legislative amendment on disciplinary proceedings did
not overturn the system fundamentally, because it left them, in large part,
within the domain of the bar. Nevertheless, it should be assessed as part of
a proactive and critical standpoint emerging from the government and the
Knesset, signaling a current change in their relative powers. This approach
treats dubiously lawyers' claims for professional independence and entrusts
lawyers with societal obligations, thus accentuating the public rather than
private nature of the profession.
99. Protocol 401, supra note 97, at 17.
100. Id. at 23 (statement of Member of the Knesset Itshak Levi).
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V. OBLIGATIONS TOWARD NONREPRESENTED THIRD PARTIES
The private-public tension embodied in lawyers' ethos is manifested in
an inherent professional "loyalty intersection." Lawyers simultaneously
carry multiple obligations to their clients, to the court, to the profession, to
fellow colleagues, to opposing parties, to their employers, to their own
personal interests and beliefs, and to the public at-large. They need to
constantly balance these duties, a task that is complicated due to frequent
discord between different interests. The body that determines how to
balance out these competing interests operates therefore as a regulator, by
setting the array of rights and rules by which lawyers must carry out this
task.
Regulation of this sort can be conducted through different venues: direct
legislation (for example reporting duties),' 0 ' ethical rules (for example bar
disciplinary procedures), administrative and intuitional controls, 10 2 or
liability rules. 103
Liability rules operate on the basis of ex post complaints and lawsuits
(usually for monetary damages) filed against lawyers by injured parties.
The large part of them are malpractice law suits of injured clients; it is
through cases of this sort that courts define professional competency and set
lawyers' standards of practice.10 4
But liability claims are not limited to clients and are often launched by
nonclient third parties who have been harmed either by a client who was
represented by a lawyer now being sued, or by the lawyer directly. In these
cases, courts are called upon to define the scope of lawyers' professional
duties toward third parties, oftentimes when these duties stand in direct
conflict with the lawyer's primary duty to further the interests of his or her
own client.
Cases of this sort, in particular those in which a client's conduct has
injured third parties, reveal the broader dispute about the extent to which
lawyers should play a role in controlling socially undesirable behavior of
their clients. This is a fundamental question that lies at the heart of the
101. See Shelley D. Gatlin, Note, Attorney Liability Under Deceptive Trade Practices
Acts, 15 REV. LITIG. 397, 400 n.9 (1996); see also Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 784 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.);
15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006).
102. See Fred C. Zacharias, Understanding Recent Trends in Federal Regulation of
Lawyers, 2003 PROF. LAW. (SYMPOSIUM ISSUE) 15, 16-22.
103. See Wilkins, supra note 13, at 806-07; Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green,
Rationalizing Judicial Regulation of Lawyers, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming Spring 2009),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1324206.
104. As most lawyers carry malpractice insurance, insurance companies are playing a
growing role in setting professional standards as well. In Israel, the courts have been
elevating lawyers' standard of behavior toward their clients and demanding a heightened
level of competence, particularly in land transactions. See, e.g., CC (TA) 2184/99 Sharon v.
Leibovitz (1998) 6408 (3) 2002 (Isr.) (Hayut, J.) (imposing civil liability upon a lawyer for
drafting a contract that did not protect sufficiently the clients who were purchasing an
apartment).
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debate about lawyers' ethics.'0 5 Is the lawyer simply the "long arm" of the
client, and therefore not accountable to the consequences of the client's act
as long she remains "within the bounds of law"? Or do we expect the
lawyer to bear a heightened standard of behavior when third parties might
be harmed and to use measures to protect them? That lawyers owe some
direct duties to third parties-at times on account of their clients'
interests-reflects the notion that lawyers are not only officers of the court
in the narrow sense of this term, but that we expect them to exhibit higher
standards of morality as part of their role in the justice system at-large. 10 6
In other words, as the courts in Israel determine lawyers' liability in these
circumstances, they are in fact transforming the theoretical and moral
debate about professional accountability into binding legal standards.
Examining civil suits (rather than disciplinary processes) addressing
lawyers' liability toward third parties is informative because negligent
professional conduct does not necessarily constitute a disciplinary or ethical
offense.
In Israel, courts have dealt with questions of liability toward third parties
in a broad array of circumstances. 10 7 They have imposed civil liability
upon lawyers when lawyers established a direct relationship with
nonclients, when they undertook to carry out a task benefiting a nonclient,
when the lawyer provided a service to a person who had relied upon the
lawyer, and when the lawyer misrepresented himself as having a duty
toward the affected person. 1°8 In cases of this sort, the courts imposed a
duty, which previously had not been recognized, toward an affected party
beyond the strict lawyer-client relationship, finding lawyers liable for the
damages caused by their acts. The courts have thus regulated the profession
by setting a normative behavioral standard upon the lawyer, qua lawyer,
even if the same activity did not constitute an ethical offense.i 09 However
in most cases of this sort there had not been a direct conflict between the
interest of a client and an affected third party.
The Israeli courts have taken the duty to nonclients a step further. In a
number of cases litigated in the last decade, the courts were asked to
recognize the civil liability of lawyers for monetary damages caused to an
unrepresented, opposing party as a result of a legal transaction in which the
105. See, e.g, FREEDMAN, supra note 26; LUBAN, supra note 25; Gordon, supra note 25;
Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 543;
Simon, supra note 25; Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues,
5 HuM. Rrs. 1, 12 (1975).
106. See LUBAN, supra note 25, at 166-69. David Luban claims that lawyers must act as
moral buffers between their clients and potentially injured third parties. Id; see also
Zacharias, supra note 20, at 3-5, 7 (summarizing argument for lawyers' adoption of an
ethical stance based on "universally applicable morality").
107. The most comprehensive research on this topic has been conducted by Limor Zer-
Guttman. See generally Zer-Guttman, supra note 15; Zer-Guttman, supra note 32.
108. Zer-Guttman, supra note 15, at 172-83.
109. See John H. Bauman, A Sense of Duty: Regulation of Lawyer Responsibility to Third
Parties by the Tort System, 37 S. TEX. L. REv. 995, 1012-17 (1996). The basic liability of
lawyers toward third parties was established in Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958).
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lawyer had represented a client.110  In all cases, the legal transaction
involved either the purchase of a home or some other transaction of real
property by the nonclient, and, in all cases, the lawyer had represented the
developer, the contractor, or a lender. The legal documents governing the
transaction were drawn up by the lawyer, who looked after the interests of
his clients alone and did not adequately protect the interests of the
opposing, weaker party. As a result of these unbalanced deals, the third
parties lost assets and sued the lawyers for their damages. The lawyers
claimed that they owed fiduciary duties and a duty of care to their clients
only and thus could not be held liable for the damages that occurred to
opposing parties. They further argued that, if the court recognized their
liability to protect the interests of nonclients, this would entail a breach of
their duties to their clients.
In two recent cases, the Israeli Supreme Court rejected these arguments.
Instead, the court inquired into the actual relationships that evolved between
those involved in the transaction. The judges examined the power
disparities between the parties; the type of transaction that was at stake
(acquisition of a personal home or a mortgage of a small business); the
extent of the lawyer's involvement in setting up the legal transaction; the
way the lawyer had presented herself during the deal; the level of trust that
was actually bestowed upon the lawyer by the third party; how foreseeable
the damage had been at the time of the transaction; and, in general, the
"fairness" of the event. It recognized that lawyers have duties of care
toward nonclients in circumstances of severe imbalance of power between
parties, deep lawyer involvement in the transaction, actual reliance upon the
lawyer by the nonrepresented party, and when that party was not advised by
the lawyer to consult or hire an independent lawyer.Il The Court further
ruled that in order to fulfill this duty the lawyer may be expected to take
legal measures to protect the opposing party, even if it might be
disadvantageous for the client.
Nahum v. Durnbaum is a particularly telling case.11 2 In this instance, a
lawyer represented a lender in a complicated legal transaction in which the
opposing party, a couple who urgently needed a loan, agreed to draconic
borrowing terms and to the imposition of a lien on their home as security
for the loan (the transaction included excessive interest rates, severe
penalties for nonpayment, and harsh terms of immediate foreclosure). The
borrowers were not represented during the legal transaction and the lawyer
did not advise them that they ought to consult with a lawyer on their part.
As expected, the loan was not repaid according to its terms, and the family
lost its home and acquired additional heavy monetary losses. The lawyer
110. E.g., CA 2625/02 Nahum v. Durnbaum [2004] IsrSC 58(3) 385; CA 6645/00 Arad v.
Even [2002] IsrSC 56(5) 365; CA 1170/91 Bekhor v. Yehiell [1994] IsrSC 48(3) 207; CA
751/89 Mushapor v. Shohat [1992] IsrSC 46(4) 531; CA 37/86 Levy v. Sherman [1990]
lsrSC 44(4) 446.
111. See Arad, IsrSC 56(5)passim; Nahum, IsrSC 58(3)passim.
112. Nahum, IsrSC 58(3) at 385.
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who represented the lender was found to have violated his duties of care
toward the nonclient borrowers. The court determined that he acted
negligently toward them and was thus liable for part of the damages
suffered. Chief Justice Barak noted that the lawyer should have devised the
transaction differently, in a way that would guarantee more protection to the
borrowers, protection that contract law itself affords in land transactions of
this sort. At the least, stated Chief Justice Barak, the lawyer should have
notified the borrowers that they were entitled to certain protections by law,
since they were mortgaging their personal home, and he should have
advised them not to sign the mortgage contract before they received all the
money. By not doing so, the lawyer violated his direct duty toward the
nonclient, notwithstanding the disadvantage this may have caused his
client.1 13
The notable point in this case is that the borrowers filed suit against the
lender, but lost the case on contractual grounds. The civil court held that
the contract could not be invalidated on legal grounds of undue duress or
coercion. In other words, the client-lender had acted "within the bounds of
law"; nevertheless, the lawyer was held to a different, elevated standard of
behavior. By recognizing a direct duty of the lawyer to the nonclient
borrower, and by holding the lawyer to a higher normative standard than his
client, the court struck a balance between client interests and inferiorly
situated, nonrepresented third parties who put faith in the lawyer. In the
words of Chief Justice Barak,
The deal the lawyer had cooked up created a complex legal situation. The
understanding of this situation requires knowledge in the law .... Of
course, due to the legal complexity of the transaction[,] the appellate, as a
lawyer, enjoys a significant advantage of knowledge and control. The
respondents, on the other hand, were at an inferior position and they
trusted the legal talents of the [lawyer]. They trusted his integrity, skills
and honesty.114
Through the definition of negligence, the court gave meaning to the
public role of the lawyer: the lawyer could not claim that he satisfied his
professional duties by utilizing all of the means the "law" made available to
his client. As a lawyer, the expectation was that he perform his duties not
only by following the letter of the law, but also by adhering to its spirit and
purpose. It is highly probable that in this kind of situation, the bar was
unlikely to regard the lawyer's behavior as unethical, according to existing
disciplinary standards.
This judicial outcome was not unanticipated. In general, the courts are
inclined to consider lawyers' duties toward the court (and thus, the public)
as trumping their duties to their clients when those are in conflict. More
than once, the Israeli Supreme Court has stated that during adjudication,
113. Id. at 428-29.
114. Id. at 426-27.
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lawyers' duties to clients ought to cede those owed to the judiciary. 115
Nahum v. Durnbaum thus can be seen as an extension of this viewpoint into
transactional practice. By setting this standard, the court redefined the
public/private boundaries of lawyers' duties.
CONCLUSION
Since the 1990s, the legal profession has been subjected to increased
regulation from multiple, external sources. This regulatory transformation
is not occurring through comprehensive reforms like those that took place
in the United Kingdom and New Zealand in the last decades. The change
occurs through piecemeal, small-scale, incremental encroachment on the
previously tight system of self-regulation.
When state institutions begin setting lawyers' terms of practice, they
bring along a particular vision of the legal profession's role in an open
society. This vision does not adhere to the strong version of client loyalty.
It weakens lawyers' self-interests and attempts to impose broader public
commitments upon the profession. In this essay, I have described in detail
two newly established arrangements of this sort, but there are many others.
State agencies now see lawyers as gatekeepers of the public good and
require them to heighten their reporting duties. The legislature demands
that they open up the profession to greater transparency, accountability, and
competition (uncoincidentally, all characteristic of a functioning
democracy). Judges have begun to impose direct sanctions on lawyers who
do not assist the court to administer what they define as justice. Courts
have begun to intervene more often in fee agreements between clients and
lawyers, with a view toward greater protections of clients' interests. Courts
are setting higher standards in civil malpractice suits. This judicial
intervention may not reveal a coherent and well-developed standpoint about
lawyers' societal roles, but it does signal a change. The anticompetitive,
protective, and self-interested nature of the profession can not and should
not be sustained any longer.
Alongside state regulation, competition is also challenging the bar's
entrenched control over the market for legal services. To begin with,
commercial companies and nonprofit organizations are entering the terrain
in which lawyers had dominated exclusively. What used to be a rather
quiet front in the early decades of Israeli statehood now requires constant
maintenance and monitoring from the bar, which has been losing the
stronghold in determining who can provide legal services. From a different
front, as the number of malpractice suits increase, insurance companies are
playing a larger part in setting lawyers' standards of competence and
professionalism.
To be sure, this type of market-originated, indirect regulation is hardly
interested in defining a public role for lawyers and is mostly driven by
115. See, e.g., CA 6185/00 Hana v. State of Isr. [2001] IsrSC 56(1) 366; CrimA 196/97
Martinez v. State of Isr. [1997] IsrSC 50(5) 591.
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profit making. Nonetheless, due to these changes, the organized bar needs
to compete for clients and consumers by persuading the public that lawyers
are more than just profit maximizers, and that they carry an added value to
their professionalism.
The profession now depends on multiple external bodies to control its
terms of practice, instead of one unified body as was in the past. Given the
stratification of the bar and the diverse professional ideologies from within,
it has become more difficult for lawyers to resist change by forming a
united professional front to counter the new regulators and the interests they
represent.
It is within this framework that the private-public tension embodied
within the legal profession is being redefined. The bar from within, and the
new regulators from outside, will determine together how Israeli lawyers
will fuse their private commitments and public ideals.
